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AARON J. PRISBREY (USB No. 6968) 
Attorney for Petitioner and Appellant 
1090 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone 435/673-1661 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAYNEJEX, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
v. 
PRECISION EXCAVATING 
and/or OWNERS INSURANCE 
CO., 
Appellee/Respondents 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 20100674 
ARGUMENT 
JEX CONCEDES THE ISSUE AS ARGUED BY PRECISION. 
Precision argues in its Brief that the appropriate issue to be resolved on this appeal is 
whether "Mr. Jex's motor vehicle accident 'arose out of and in the course of his 
employment' under section 34A-2-401, Utah Code, entitling him to receive worker's 
compensation benefits". Precision brief at 1. Jex concedes this is the appropriate issue 
on this appeal. 
1 
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I 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS CORRECTION OF ERROR 
OR "CONDITIONALLY DEFERENTIAL." 
Precision admits that die appropriate standard of review of Commissioner 
Hayashi's legal determination as to whether Jex was injured by accident arising out of his 
work is correction-of-error. Precision Brief at 1. However, Precision also claims the 
determination of the Commissioner is a "mixed question of law and fact" apparently 
claiming the application of a deferential standard. Precision brief at 1-2. 
Jex submits that the correct standard of review is correction-of-error. Specifically, 
the Commissioner in concluding that the going and coming rule applies to bar Jex's claim, 
erroneously interprets the law in two separate instances. 
First, she interprets VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm 'n. 901 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 
1995) as requiring that "in order to be exempt from the going and coining rule, Mr. Jex 
must show that his truck served as an instrumentality to benefit Precision Excavating's 
business at the time of the accident." (R. at 71) {emphasis added). VanLeeuwen 
contains no such requirement. As set forth below, Jex does not need to prove his truck 
was an instrumentality of the business "at the time of the accident." 
Second the Commissioner interprets Cross v. Bd of Review of Industrial Comm 'n. 
824 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1992), as requiring Jex to demonstrate he conferred a "significant 
benefit to an employer such that the going and coming rule does not apply. (R. at 71.) 
{emphasis added). Cross contains no such requirement. As set forth below, Jex need not 
demonstrate the benefit to the employer be "significant." As such the determination of the 
2 
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Commissioner should be reviewed for correction-of-error. 
Utah courts have consistently held that a determination as to whether an accident 
arises out of and in the course of employment is to be reviewed for correctness. As set forth 
above, both parties concede that the issue to be addressed here is whether the 
Commissioner correctly interpreted section 34A-2-40L In Cross, this court held that the 
Act does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion to the Commission to interpret the 
specific statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994). Id at 1204. (Now 
codified at 34A-3-401). As such, the determination of the Commissioner must be 
reviewed for correctness. 
In the event this Court determines Commissioner Hayashi properly construed 
VanLeetcwen and Cross, Jex would concede that a deferential standard would apply as to 
whether the Commisioner applied the law to the facts correctly. However, the standard is 
a "conditionally deferential standard," granting some deference to the Commissioner but 
requiring an "employee-friendly" analysis. 
In Salt Lake City Corp v. Labor Coram % 2007 UT 4, Para 13; 153 P.3d 179, 180 
(2007) the Supreme Court set forth the "conditional deferential" standard in the 
"multifarious array of factual settings presented by scope-of-employment cases". 
The issue before us is a mixed question of law and fact, one that calls 
upon us to review the application of law to fact. The facts relating to the 
accident and the take-a-car-home program are undisputed. We concern 
ourselves with the interplay between these facts and the eligibility 
requirements for workers1 compensation benefits found in Utah's 
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code sections 34A-2-101 to -803. 
3 
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In Drake, we explored in considerable detail the standard of review that 
we should assign to appeals from Industrial Commission rulings based 
on mixed questions of law and fact. We undertook this exploration in a 
context very similar to the one here. The facts were undisputed, and the 
legal principle the Commission applied to the facts was the "special 
errand" doctrine, a cousin of the going and coming rule that we examine 
today. 
We settled upon a conditionally deferential standard of review grounded 
in two considerations. First, practical difficulties attend any attempt to 
craft coherent and evolving legal rules from the multifarious array of 
factual settings presented by scope-of-employment cases. In this 
environment, our preeminent role, as an appellate court charged with 
interpreting the law, would shrink away if we became a forum to merely 
reassess the facts. See Drake, 939 P.2d at 181 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 
936). 
Furthermore, our statutory obligation to give effect to the Act's purpose 
to malleviat[e] hardship upon workers and their families'" heightens the 
degree of oversight of Commission rulings, particularly those that result 
in a denial of benefits. Id. at 182 (quoting Baker v. Indus. Comm'n, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613, 614 (Utah 1965)). We will therefore look 
closely to assure ourselves that the Commission has liberally construed 
and applied the Act to provide coverage and has resolved any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation in favor of an injured employee. Id. 
at 182 (citing State Tax Comm'n v. Indus. Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 
(Utah 1984)). 
Our obligation to adopt an employee-friendly perspective on 
scope-of-employment cases from the Commission highlights the 
material difference between this case and the earlier case involving this 
accident, Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315. 
Unlike Ms. Ross's quest for benefits, the Ahlstrom plaintiffs were not 
entitled to a sympathetic application of the going and coming rule in aid 
of their effort to make Salt Lake City vicariously liable for Ms. Ross's 
negligence. Thus, elements of the take-a-car-home program that were 
insufficient to render Ms. Ross an employee for the purpose of Salt Lake 
City's vicarious liability were nevertheless adequate to make Ms. Ross 
eligible to receive workers'compensation benefits. 
4 
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We break no new ground by applying different standards of review to 
scope-of-employment cases derived from vicarious liability and 
workers' compensation cases. JnAhlstrom, we anticipated the arrival of 
this appeal when we stated that 
[w]ith very different presumptions governing worker's 
compensation and negligence cases, it would not be 
wise to hold that the rules governing scope of 
employment questions in one area are wholly 
applicable to the other because the legal effect of 
identical facts may be different in a negligence case 
than in a worker's compensation case. 
Ahlstorm, 2003 UT 4, P 7, 73 P.3d 315. 
Salt Lake City Corp., Para. 13-18. 
PRECISION'S ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S CONCLUSION IS NOT RELEVANT. 
The parties concede the sole issue to be addressed in this case is whether Jex's 
motor vehicle accident arose out of and in the course of employment. This ultimate 
conclusion rests on whether the Labor Commission properly applied the law to the facts. 
However, in its brief, Precision relies on the analysis of the ALJ, not that of the Labor 
Commissioner. In fact, in its brief, Precision sets forth two and one-half single spaced, 
pages of the ALJ's analysis and then proceeds to present argument as to how the analysis of 
the ALJ is appropriate. (Precision Brief at 17-19.) 
However, the Labor Commissioner did not adopt the legal analysis of the ALJ1. 
Instead, the Commissioner adopted the findings of the ALJ and supplanted the discussion 
1
 As such, Jex will not address the fallacies of the analysis used by the ALJ. 
5 
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and Conclusions of Law of the ALJ with her own discussion and Conclusion of Law. (R. 
at 70-71.) Utah law is clear that an appeal from the Labor Commission is from the Labor 
Commissioner's ultimate conclusion, not that of the ALJ. In relevant part Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-l-303(6) provides: 
If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after the party appealing the order has 
exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to: 
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or 
Appeals Board; or 
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the 
commissioner or Appeals Board being appealed 
{emphasis added.) 
As such, it is appropriate to review only those conclusions of law reached by 
Commissioner Hayashi, not those of the ALJ. 
VANLEEUWEN DOES NOT REQUIRE AN mJTJllED WORKER 
DEMONSTRATE HIS VEHICLE WAS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE BUSINESS 
"AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT." 
In determining that the going and coming rule applies as a bar to compensation, the 
Commissioner relies upon VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm 'n, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 
1995). The Commissioner specifically concluded that "in order to be exempt from the 
going and coming rule, Mr. Jex must show that his truck served as an instrumentality to 
benefit Precision Excavating5 s business at the time of the accident." (R. at 71.) 
(emphasis added.) The law places no such burden on the injured worker. The 
6 
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appropriate test in determining whether an employee's vehicle is an instrumentality of the 
employer has nothing to do with whether the vehicle is benefitting the employer "at the 
time of the accident." Rather, the focus is whether the employer requires the employee to 
use the vehicle as an instrumentality of the business. See Bailey v. Industrial Comm 'n, 
398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965); State v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). 
In Jex's case, the Commissioner's analysis as to whether Jex's vehicle was an 
instrumentality of the business ended as she simplistically indicated that it was not an 
instrumentality that was benefitting Precision at the time of the accident. As the 
Commissioner has set forth a legal standard which is not recognized by Utah law, her 
ultimate conclusions are not correct, and Jex submits her decision must be reversed as a 
matter of law. 
CROSS DOES NOT REQUIRE AN INJURED WORKER DEOMONSTRATE THE 
USE OF HIS VEHICLE CONFER A "SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT" UPON THE 
EMPLOYER. 
The Commissioner's conclusion that Cross v. Bd. of Review of Industrial Comm 'n. 
824 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1992), requires Jex to demonstrate he conferred a "significant 
benefit" on Precision erroneously states Utah law. When the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed this exact issue, it stated that a determination of scope-of-employment in "going 
and coming" cases comes down to "one unit of measure - - benefit." Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Labor Comm % 2007 UT 4, Para. 20. To be precise, the inquiry should be focused on 
7 
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whether the employer derived a benefit from the employee's actions. Indeed, the court 
stated that whatever benefits an employee derives from those same actions are "largely 
irrelevant" and "cannot be used to offset or diminish the significance of the benefits 
derived by the [employer] in making this calculation." Id. at Para. 25. 
If the employee is "engaged in an activity that is at least incidental to 
employment," then that employee is acting within the scope of employment under Utah's 
workers' compensation laws. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm 9n. at Para. 23. 
{emphasis added.) "We have long indicated that the benefit to an employer need not be 
predominant over those of an employee before the employee becomes eligible for 
workers'compensation benefits." Id. at Para. 23. {emphasis added.) 
While employer control has been applied as a factor in addressing 
scope-of-employment issues, it is more "usefully thought of as a gauge by which to 
measure the allocation of benefits." Id. at fii. 2 (citing VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm 'n, 
901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Indeed, the Utah courts have recognized that even an 
employee's unilateral actions could properly fall within the scope of employment when 
they were "motivated in-part by a purpose to benefit employment." Ae Clevite v. Labor 
Comm 'n, 2000 UT App. 35, Para. 10, 996 P.2d 1072 (cited with approval in Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n at fii. 2). 
8 
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Contrary to the conclusion of the Commissioner, Utah law does not require Jex 
demonstrate that he is conferring a "significant benefit" on Precision to avoid being barred 
by the "going and coming rule,"11 Indeed , if he has demonstrated that he has conferred a 
h ;TI <: •" "^  h • - - t • i : i: v i denial"" on Precision while going or coming to the work place, he 
has established his burden and is entitled to benefits. The I ,abor Commissioner's 
determination that he must confer a "significant benefit" is erroneous and contrary to Utah 
la v\ \ s si ich, the Com missioned s i iltima te conclu sions are not correct and Jex si ibmits 
her decision must be reversed as a matter of law. 
THE LABOR COMMISSIONER MISAPPLIED THE LAW 
i L * • M, •. - .. •, jjoner 11itcipreted dross iiml 
VanLeeuweti correct^ , Jex submits that she misapplied the law to the facts of this case, m 
concluding that Jex's claim., was barred by the going and. coming rule, the Commissioner 
made ;»)ur ultimate conclusions which are misapplied She • concluded: 
. 1. Jex aiu not show his tr nek served as an instrumentahL\ ;> benefit Precision 
Excavating's business at the time of the accident. (R. at 71.) 
' 2. Mr. T,;\" has not slu.-wn that lii> truck was being used to benefit Precision 
Excavation when ihe accident occurred fR r- ""* * 
3 . K i t " . J C X S UCClUvJiiL ULLLIi i C(I UUJ i i lL v M - . : . . ] ; . : . ; . i h L i U I N . .: . f 
C<~\m fni^r\C'*" in f- •- i P •*? ""'* 
4. Jex was "not under Precision Excavating's control" at the time of the 
accident. (R. at 71.) 
9 
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The facts upon which the Commissioner reached her ultimate conclusions are 
largely undisputed . 
1. "Mr. Jex and Trent Holden, Mr. Jex's supervisor on the date of the accident, 
offered sworn testimony. Mr. Jex testified that he was hired by Precision 
Excavation in St. George* Utah and worked on jobs in that area." (R. at 32.) 
2. "Mr. Holden testified there was a downturn in work available in the St. 
George area and the company was going to lay off employees." (R. at 32.) 
3. "The company was able to find a construction project in Cedar City and 
offered the choice to existing employees to work on the Cedar City proj ect in 
lieuoflay~off"(R.at32.) 
4. "Cedar City is approximately a 50 to 60 minute drive from St. George." (R. 
at32.) 
5. "Mr. Holden indicated that he had told employees that there would be one 
shuttle available using the one truck assigned to Mr. Holden and that the 
seats were on first come basis." (R. at 32.) 
6. Jex testified "that when he drove his own truck he waited at a designated 
meeting site where Trent would pick up employees choosing to ride in the 
company truck." (R. at 33.) 
7. "Trent had asked the Petitioner to wait a bit longer for a chronically late 
employee named, Nick." (R. at 33.) 
8. "Trent asked the Petitioner to wait an additional ten minutes to see if Nick 
arrived and then Nick would ride to the job with Petitioner." (R. at 33.) 
9. "Nick was often tardy and this became a pattern." (R. at 33.) 
2
 In his Brief, Jex takes issue with hearsay statements made to Holden from Irvin, which facts 
were used by the ALJ and adopted by the Commissioner. However, the hearsay statements of 
Irvin are largely irrelevant to the Commissioner's analysis, and for the purposes of this 
analysis Jex assumes the ALJ correctly relied on Irvin's out of Court Statements. 
10 
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'Petitioner did not know Nick except through work." (R. at 33. j 
"Nkk aid not share gas expenses with Petitioner."" (R. at 33.) 
" The company ne\ er reimbursed the Petitioner for his time or travel." (R. at 
-s ^ j 
- - ' / 
V- hue Jex was waiting for Nick, "Trent would leave with the employees that 
were ready on time." (R at 33.) 
Jex testified that 'there was no "ride share agreement" with Nick. (R 74 -if 
25.) 
Jex testified that the only reason he picked up Nick is because thai is 
something his supervisor, Trent Holden. had asked him to do in onjt-r to 
relieve room inside the single cab truck that Holden was dri\ ing and because 
Holden did not want to have to wail for Nkl *« •• arm e delaying Holders 
arrival at the Cedar City jobsite. (R. " 4 at 2 ^ ) 
Jcx testified that if he did not take Nick to the jobsite as requested by TTolden 
that he would be replaced for "undermining their intelligence." ( K "M it 
^ *>. \ 
Holden testified that it was beneficial for Precision to have Nick taken to the 
jobsite from St George. (R 74 at 133-1 34 ) 
.'he iViiLioiier brought an exhibit ol tools that he carried in his truck to and 
from the jobsite." (R. at ^ ) 
here was a tape measure that he indicated he used 'pretty much every 
day '"(R at 33.) 
"There was a large pipe and crescent wrench whic; i ;e ;,sai IO work on some 
of the equipment at the jobsite." (R at 33.) 
11 
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21. "There was a sledgehammer." (R. at 33.) 
22. There was a "homemade level device that he had modified for use on the 
Cedar City job." (R. at 33.) 
23. "Mr. Jex also testified at one time his truck was used to move a company 
compressor from one area to another at the job site (his truck had a hitch on 
it)." (R. at 34.) 
24. "He also had some machinery fluids that belonged to his employer and were 
used in some of the equipment that he used at the j obsite." (R. at 3 3.) 
25. "Petitioner said that the level had been made at the request of his supervisor, 
Trent Holden." (R. at 33.) 
26. "The tools were taken to and from the jobsite in the Petitioner's truck and 
were in the truck on the date of the accident." (R. at 3 3.) 
27. Holden testified that Jex would have preferred using Jex's own tools on the 
jobsite, because Holden's pickup truck was "at the higher jobsite and the 
company vehicle would be at the lower jobsite, so it would have been easier 
for him to use them." (R. 74 at 101.) 
28. While initially testifying that the distance between the upper and the lower 
jobsite was about 3,000 yards, Holden later testified that it would be 
approximately 400 yards for Jex to walk to get tools, so whenever he needed 
a tool he would be required to walk 800 yards round trip. (R. 74 at 
125-127.) 
29. Jex testified that he used his own tools at the jobsite because Mr. Holden's 
truck was "rarely in [his] area for [him] to use" and that it was "almost a 
quarter mile to where his truck was sometimes." (R. 74 at 73-74.) 
30. "Mr. Jex gave detailed testimony about two errands he had run for Precision 
Excavation while on the Cedar City job." (R. at 34.) 
12 
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31. "He had gone to a NAPA auto parts store and also to Wheeler Machinery to 
get needed parts for the job equipment." (R. at 34.) 
32. ' "'He had used his own truck to run 'those errands." (R. at 34.) 
33. On the July 22, 2008, date of the accident, "at the end of the workday Trent 
Holden was giving Petitioner instructions (or ihe following day and told him 
he could go ahead and leave." (R. at 33.j 
34. "Trent I lolden indicated that he would be working overtime." (R. at 33.) 
35. "Petitioner drove down a hill away from, the immediate work area and 
• noticed that a Mustang vehicle belonged to a co-worker was not on site." 
. , (Ra t 33.) 
3 6. "The Petitioner assumed that Mr. Irvin rode in the company truck. The 
Petitioner assumed that the co-work, James Irvin, might need a ride home 
since Trent was working late." (R. at 33.) 
3 7. "Petitioner went back to his supervisor, Trent, and asked if he needed to give 
James a ride home." (R .at 33.) 
38. "Trent said, 'Yea go ask James if he wants to go now, and give him a ride.'" 
(R. at 33 . ) • • 
30. Jcx gave Irvin a ride and testified (ha! he was not headed straight home at the 
time of the accident, bui A as rather taking Ir\h* in vTiere his \ chirk wa^  •* 
and after dropping off In in lie w on id head h<«. ie i K "4 at 60.) 
1 he Com missioner did not apply tl le k1 v in an "employee-friendly" man nei to the 
"multifarious array of facts" presented by this scope-of-employment case. Her failure to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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apply the law in such a manner to the complex fact pattern was inappropriate and her 
decision is therefore flawed. 
THE COMMISSIONER MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO THE FACTS IN 
CONCLUDING JEX'S TRUCK WAS NOT AN INSTRUMENTALITY 
OF PRECISION'S BUSINESS. 
The Labor Commissioner concludes that Jex failed to show that his truck served as 
an instrumentality benefitting Precision Excavation at the time of the accident. As set 
forth above, Jex does not believe the law requires a showing that his truck was benefitting 
Precision "at the time of the accident". However, conceding the point, the facts clearly 
demonstrate Jex was using his truck as an instrumentality of the business, which benefitted 
Precision at the time of the accident. 
Jex was told by his supervisor, Holden, where to meet every morning before 
heading to Cedar in his truck. He was told to wait for Nick for 10 minutes at which point 
Holden would leave for the jobsite with other employees. If Nick didn't show up, Jex was 
then free to go ahead and drive up to the jobsite. Jex didn't know Nick, did not share gas 
expenses with Nick and testified that there was no "ride share agreement" with Nick. Jex 
testified the only reason he picked up Nick was because that is something Holden asked 
him to do in order to relieve room inside Holden's single cab truck and so Holden wouldn't 
be delayed from going to the Cedar City jobsite. Additionally, Jex testified that he 
believed he would be replaced for undermining the intelligence of his employer if he didn't 
transport Nick to the jobsite. 
14 
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Jex also took his own tools to the jobsite everyday to use at the Cedar City jobsite. 
He took a level, tape measure, crescent wrenches, pipe wrenches, sledgehammer, and also 
carried on his truck llnids thai lit would use on tin: jobsite He used his truck li > i im 
errand s on two separate occasions during the three to four week period he was e* *ir :. ;^ the 
Cedar City jobsite He used his truck to ,\]]o\\ his Precision in rno\ c a compresses from 
one area of the jobsite to another Then, on fh^ ciaic o; OK .vuJcm. tL-> ne was preparing to 
leave the Cedar City jobsite, Jex asked 1 lis si iperv isor, I lolden, ifheshoi lldtakeli v in home 
with him. Trent said, "Yeah go ask James if he wants to go now, and give him a ride.~ 
While Holden testified that Jex realK didn't need to use his tools on the jobsite, it is 
evident •: ia! laiiuru a Jnsowoh, i ' \ ; \ , - : , ; : .u. •. *e:> JIH-'C •..,:; J \ scsiifieo ! K ... 
^ * »;.' -. ;\.- io •••;-• - . - ••• - /is ..*. ;•. -: o-- * -n • ;;unrk:r ui a mile iroin the company 
truck. This is confirmed by Holden who i ndicates Jex would have to wal k about 400 
yards or 800 years, round trip. Based on the testimony of Jex and Holden, J ex would have 
to walkabout! 2 mile to get fluid or grease for his track hoe • or e qi lipment to change 
hammers and buckets on the track hoe. These activities certainly benefitted Precision. 
The evidence is unrefuted that Jex was ferrying employees back and forth to the 
Cedar jobsite at his employer's request and that he was using 1 1 is tools ai id tr uck to benefit 
prf c j s .. i; •uneoftlr- -s> '-k'-r '.-. . tools and a co-employee were in his vehicle. 
3 The ALJ made additional faajai deLenninations as to w KJI ILV 111 allegedly said to 
Holden after the accident. Those findings are irrelevant as the ALJ found and the 
Commissioner adopted the finding that Trent told Jex to ''go ask James if he wants to go 
and give him a ride " 
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Applying the law to these facts, Jex's truck was an instrumentality of Precision's business 
as he was benefiting Precision at the time of the accident. 
THE COMMISSIONER MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO THE FACTS 
WHEN SHE CONCLUDED JEX HAS NOT SHOW THAT HIS TRUCK 
WAS BEING USED TO BENEFIT PRECISION EXCAVATION WHEN 
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED. 
At the time of the accident, Jex was transporting a co-employee by the name of 
James to the designated drop off and pick up area. He was specifically told to do so by his 
supervisor, as Holden told Jex to "give him a ride." Holden testified that transporting 
employees was a benefit to Precision. Jex testified that it was beneficial to Precision, 
because Holden did not have room in his truck to carry the other employees. 
Additionally, as set forth above, at the time of the accident Jex's truck was loaded with 
tools that were used at the jobsite every day. The use of these tools and bringing them to 
the jobsite each and every day certainly benefitted Precision in that Jex was much more 
productive in using his own tools to repair the track hoe and change track hoe hammers 
instead of trekking one-half mile every time he needed something out of the company 
truck. Applying the law to these facts, Jex ferrying of employees to and from the jobsite 
and use of his truck for errands and tools benefitted Precision at the time of the accident. 
THE COMMISSIONER MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO THE FACTS IN 
CONCLUDING THERE WAS A RIDE SHARING AGREEMENT THAT 
WAS OUT OF CONVENIENCE TO JEX. 
The Commissioner specifically adopted the findings of the ALJ. Those findings 
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demonstrate that Jex did not know who Nick was, did not like Nick, was not paid any gas 
1.1 -JC * \ ! u > el! - ' l - * L*Lcil;->v - ' i i Ci'S !.>Ui / ^ K C J ' . 
so. Jex testified there was no "ride sharing' agreement. Certainly, it was not convenient 
to Jex to take Nick to the jobsite, as he wx >u Id have to go to the pre™designated meeting spot 
and u ,m lor ten minutes before he was permitted to go onto Wic L aiui LU> IODSH,; : lose 
fa cts do not establish a "ride sha ring agreement" that \ vras convenient for Jex. 
Additionally, there was no "ride sharing" agreement between Jex and Irvin. He simply 
asked his employer if he should take Irvin home and w as UAd lo "give him a ndc" The 
Coniiii issioner's conclusion tha tth is w as a": 'i ide * .:i: • ._ m :«. :AA., . . - - .A^-A^C 
misapplies the law to the facts. 
THE COMMISSIONER MISAPPLIED THE LAW T O THE FACTS IN 
CONCLUDING JEX WAS NOT UNDER PRECISION EXCAVATION'S 
CONTROT 
The Commissioner concluded that Jex was not under the control of Precision as part of 
her analysis in denying Jex benefits. 11 uwever, this conclusion fails to recognize the realities 
O- • 1VA "''..'it*'^": l ' - . i f - J = % - • L ;* . t l ; - : . - 1 : - ! ' :• ! • < ; ! - i - : i r * .* : \ . n , ' 
to wait for Nick, I hen, on the date of the accident, he wai> uiking James back tu the 
predetermined pick up point as instructed to do by his supervisor, I lolden. Certainly;, the 
back to the pick uj - * evidences control on the pa it of Precision Excavation. I he 
Commissioner's determination to the contrary simply misapplies the law to the facts. 
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THE COMMISSIONER DID NOT APPLY THE FACTS TO THE LAW 
IN AN "EMPLOYEE-FRIENDLY" ANALYSIS. 
The Utah Courts have consistently required the courts to have a sympathetic 
application of the going and coming rule to alleviate hardship upon injured workers and 
their families. See Baker v. Industrial Comm 'n, 405 P.2d 613, 614 (Utah 1965); Ahlstrom 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4. In this situation, the Commissioner has not applied 
this rule of law to these facts. Jex submits that an "employee-friendly" application of the 
going and coming rule would support the conclusion that Jex would be exempt from such a 
harsh determination under the traveling employee doctrine, as he was simply going from 
the employer mandated pick up and drop off spot at the time of the accident. Further, an 
"employee-friendly" analysis would require exemption from the going and coming rule, as 
Jex was on a "special errand" taking a co-employee back to the designated drop off and 
pick up spot at the instruction of Holden. Finally, an "employee-friendly" analysis would 
lead to a determination that Jex was using his vehicle as an instrumentality of Precision to 
benefit Precision. 
Indeed, Jex is an employee that every employer should like to have. He ferried 
employees to the jobsite for whom he had no personal relationship without compensation, 
because he was asked to do so. He waited for a habitually late employee when asked so 
his supervisor could get to the jobsite early in a less crowded truck. He used his truck on 
the jobsite to move equipment. When he was asked to go on errands, he took his truck 
without being paid for fuel and without complaint. He used his tools every day on the 
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jobsite to avoid having to walk one-half mile round trip in order to get the job done. Then, 
on the date of the accident, he asked his employer «f be should take Irvin home and was 
doing just that when the accident occurred \ n '" 'employee-friendly " analy sis suggests 
that based on these facts, the application of the going and coming rule to bar Jex's claims 
would be anything but employee-friendly. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Jex respectfully requests that the determina; ion *.f 
the Labor Commissioner that Jex was not injured by accident arising out oi ana n ;nc 
coi irse of h is emploj ment be r eversed and that benefits be awarded con-. -u.:--: • • : : ' -; 
law; 
DATED this day of April, 2011 
ElizabetffB. Grimshaw 
Allornc} s for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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